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Introduction
The 2012 National Congregations Study found that only 11.4% of the total clergy
in the United States were women (ARDA 2012). As the congregation size grows, that
number declines further, with data indicating only 3.4% of congregations with 1,000 or
more members have a female leader. The number of women religious leaders increased
by less than one percent between 1998 and 2012. These statistics work well to outline a
phenomenon for female religious leaders, their inability to break the stained-glass
ceiling.
Many religious groups in the United States allow women to become ordained
leaders. However, some of the largest religious denominations, such as the Roman
Catholic Church, Southern Baptists, Mormons (Latter Day Saints), and the Orthodox
Church do not allow women to become ordained or lead congregations (Masci 2020). If
women are ordained, they often face subordinate positions and lead smaller, more rural
congregations where they are paid less (Zikmund, Lummis, and Chang 1998). For
example, the Orthodox Church does allow women to be ordained as maharats, or
leaders of Jewish law but they are not allowed to be rabbis (Masci 2020). The purpose of
this research is to examine how respondents feel about female religious leaders in the
United States, and what factors determine more or less support. This work hypothesizes
that heteronormative values that are still present within religious circles and American
society at large account for the lag in equality for women leaders.

Literature Review
Gender and Society
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In modern society, sex is at the basis of most interactions and has created the
fundamental code in which people operate (Goffman 1977). In the United States, society
places a priority on three things, sex, race, and class (Rothenberg 2004). When children
are born, they are placed into a sex class. This is the start of the socialization they will
receive their entire lives, where the two groups receive different experiences and are
placed under different societal expectations. These expectations include how to dress,
act, and move through the world around them. They develop either masculine or
feminine traits based on what they are taught is socially and societally appropriate. This
is gender identity and follows the child for the rest of their life.
For example, women in Western society are seen as fragile and pure objects.
Their purpose is viewed as caring and loving for others which makes them vulnerable
and creates their oppression. These expectations placed on women and men assume
that one group does what the other is unable to do, essentially portraying them as
opposites with different abilities or capacities (Rothenberg 2004). What may be seen as
a positive trait for a man, is a negative or a sign of dysfunction for a woman. In short,
“...frailty is fitted to strength, gentleness to sternness, diffuse serving to project
orientation, mechanical unknowingness to mechanical competencies, delicacy relative to
contamination vs. insensitivity to contamination, and so forth” (Goffman 1977, 325).
Simone de Beauvoir wrote that women are placed into a minority group, and the same
standards discussed above force women to a destiny where she has to worship men and
be subordinated (de Beauvoir 1949). She said that while men get to be the subject,
women are forced to be the other. It asserts that she is inessential to the story of their
lives, and serves three main roles - wife, mother, or guest entertainer.
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Queer theorists went on to look at gender as a societal construct and how this
construct forces women to be subordinate to their male counterparts. Foucault argued
that the body is and has always been shaped by society and that the idea of sex is
pseudo-science (Foucault 1978). Society has constructed what is normal, and not
normal sexual and gender identity through cultural power and control. It ostracizes
those who conform and punishes those who do not. Judith Butler pointed out that sex
and gender are different things (Butler 2011). Specifically, that sex and gender are both a
societal construct, not something that is measurable. It is simply an idea that has been
promoted over time and tells people in society what is acceptable and what is not. She
says that gender is improvised and performative. While current discourse has begun to
accept this idea and move towards viewing gender as a fluid and ever-changing concept,
the lasting effects that have influenced the lives of women since the beginning of the
modern world cannot be overlooked.
Heteronormative Values in the United States
Betty Friedan outlined the heteronormative values lying dormant in the 1950’s
United States in her book, The Feminine Mystique. When Friedan interviewed old
Smith College classmates and found that many were unhappy with their role, that of
wife and mother (Friedan 2010). She coined it as the “problem with no name”, one
caused by women’s role being confined to the home, which oppressed them, kept them
apart and kept them from seeing their potential. They were taught that if they tried to
leave the home, it would betray their own femininity and their husband’s masculinity.
Friedan wrote,
“The problem lay buried, unspoken, for many years in the minds of American women. It
was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a yearning that women suffered in the
middle of the twentieth century in the United States. Each suburban wife struggled with
7

it alone. As she made the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover material, ate
peanut butter sandwiches with her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts, and Brownies, lay
beside her husband at night - she was afraid to ask even herself the silent question - “Is
this all?” (Friedan 1963, 57).
While this seems like an ancient idea, one that went out with 1950’s Jell-O molds, more
recent research suggests that these normative ideals are still dictating women’s lives
today.
Heteronormativity is defined as an overarching ideology that rewards people in
society for conforming to gender conventionality, heterosexuality, and creating
traditional families (Oswald, Blume, and Marks 2005). This is not something that is
naturally occurring, it is an organized social institution that controls and dominates
society (Ingraham 1994). Heteronormativity not only dictates gender but familial
structure.
The discourse surrounding the idea of family is heteronormative, and natural
privilege occurs for traditional family structures where there is one mom, one dad, and
their children (Hudak and Giammattei 2014). It also affects sexuality. For men
especially, heterosexuality is seen as compulsory (Javaid 2018). It influences society to
see heterosexuality as something that is acceptable and public, and homosexuality is
unacceptable and private. While society knows and understands the existence of
homosexuality, they accept it only when it is held to the private sphere. This, like gender
identity, is formed during childhood. Children develop in accordance with the template
set for them by society (Bem 1983). The effects of this led to women being denied entry
into certain fields and obtaining higher career objectives.
Heteronormative values reward women for being submissive, subordinate, and
remaining in the private sphere. This phenomenon is referred to as the glass ceiling,
8

where women are kept from obtaining certain experiences because of their gender
(Cotter et al. 2001). This has kept women from obtaining goals and had led them to lag
behind in many measures of economic equality through stealth effects on things like the
economic transactions in labor markets, household resource allocation, and government
spending (Pettit and Hook 2009; Seguino 2011). Women spend nearly twice as much
time as men doing domestic work. Due to their increased domestic obligations, they
have poorer labor market outcomes than women without children.
Religion and Heteronormativity
One sphere in which these norms are particularly prominent is the religious
sphere. In general, high levels of religious belief and heteronormativity have a
significant negative relationship to social tolerance (Henshaw 2014). In addition, the
less religious a society is, the more gender equality there is and countries with the
highest amount of gender equality are where a majority of the inhabitants are without a
religious affiliation (Klingorova and Havlicek 2015; Schnabel 2016). Levels of religious
devoutness have also been found to affect gender norms, specifically leading to higher
levels of agreement with traditional familial roles, extrafamilial roles, gender
stereotypes, and gender role preference (Morgon 1987).
More recent research shows that as men’s sexist views increase, so does their
agreement with the tenets of Christianity (Maltby and Anderson 2010). Families that are
more religious also have more traditional gendered socialization (Kelley et al. 1997).
This is done through the teachings of the church. For example, religious instruction
promotes a skewed power dynamic in marriage, justifying it with teachings about
women’s role in the home and society, best described as complementarian (Perry and
Grubbs 2020). The further explanation resides in the bestowal of opportunities and
9

privileges from the church, justified by the church (Bartowski and Shah 2014). This is
evident in gender ideologies, gendered institutions, gendered interactions, and gender
identity. Additionally, when people adhere strictly to religion, simultaneously
legitimizes separate public and private spheres and maternalistic orientations.
This is further justified from leaders, and literalist interpretation of scripture
such as 1 Peter 2:11-12 or Ephesians 5:22, which prohibits women holding positions of
power (Bendroth 2001; Chaves 1997). This can be seen in women themselves as well. As
their religion becomes more hierarchical, their views on gender become more traditional
(Baker and Whitehead 2016; Eliason et al. 2017). They show increases in “...body shame,
self-silencing behaviors, hostile sexism, and benevolent sexism” (Eliason et al. 2017, 3).
In order to take a more active role in the church and secure their position, they take on a
literalist schema as a compensatory control mechanism (Brasher 1998; Giddens 1984;
Griffith 1997; Hoffmann and Bartowski 2008; Pevey, Williams, and Ellison 1996; Stacey
and Gerard 1990; Wolkomir 2004). These effects go beyond the church, affecting
women’s health. Research shows that in the Southern U.S. church communities take
away women’s empowerment and sexual confidence because of gender norms, which
contributes to declining sexual health and HIV spread (Piper et al. 2020). What is even
more concerning, is women’s subordination in the church and their lack of access to
leadership roles despite their dedication and literalist worldview.
Women Clergy and the Stained-Glass Ceiling
While women are dedicated to their religious institutions, they rarely hold on to
leadership roles and have been unable to break the stained-glass ceiling (Chaves 1997;
Djupe and Oldson 2013). They are accepted in these spheres but face consistent
subordination (Sullins 2000). The previous theory claimed that as more women were
10

ordained the disparities and patriarchal nature would decline, but instead, statistics
show that while there are women clergy, they are over-represented in subordinate
positions with lower status (Sullins 2000). Prior research indicates that this was a
consistent trend over time, throughout their career and only in congregational positions.
So while they are ordained in the churches, they are not comparable to clergymen
(Lummis and Nesbitt 2000). In addition, when women invest in religious organizations,
they rarely receive the same payouts as men (Djupe, Sokhey, and Gilbert 2007; Friesen
and Djupe 2017). Other research shows that even when they do get ordained and find
positions as the head of the clergy, they face additional challenges (Zikmund, Lummis,
and Chang 1998). As in the field as a whole, they are typically unemployed or
underemployed. They are typically underemployed, and in rural areas, because the
richer, older, members in large urban congregations prefer a male leader, and they sway
hiring decisions. When women are hired, they have a more difficult time finding worklife balance because of the heteronormative societal expectations of women, especially if
they are single. When they are single in rural areas, they have a hard time meeting
people on top of increased expectations from their parishioners without sufficient
reasoning for boundaries.
When they are able to secure clergy positions, they are able to bring a more
united, inclusive, and reflective approach to their leadership role (Lummis and Nesbitt
2000). They run their congregation differently, and it works to break down the
heteronormative ideals that are present in religious circles.
Hypothesis
Previous research has looked at the challenges that women pastors face if they
are even able to break through the stained-glass ceiling. Overall, they assert that they are
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often underemployed, unemployed, take on smaller congregations, and get paid less
(Zikmund, Lummis, and Chang 1998). Women are rarely allowed to hold leadership
positions in churches (Chaves 1997; Djupe and Oldson 2013). They are generally overrepresented in subordinate positions with little to no power (Sullins 2000). These
researchers demonstrate the difficulty women are facing in achieving equality in the
religious sphere. What is important to look at is the effect of religion itself on keeping
them in subordinate positions.
This lag in equality is because of the relationship between religion and
heteronormative values (Kelley and Dirk De Graaf 1997; Perry and Grubbs 2020).
Societies that are more religious, have less gender equality (Schnabel 2016). Scholars
believe that this is due to religious socialization causing people to see social issues as a
problem within the individual, not with society (Weiner 1993). In short, one’s religious
affiliation can determine how they feel on a wide range of political opinions - the most
notable being abortion (Lindsey, Sigillo, and Miller 2013). The more one practices their
religion orthodoxically, the less likely they are to support or have positive attitudes
toward abortion (Mavor and Gallois 2008; Medoff and Lee 1992; Putney & Middleton
1961). This displays itself in political affiliation, where Democrats and Republicans
differ on their opinion regarding the morality of abortion (Hess and Rueb 2005).
Women’s ability to advance in society is directly related to their ability to control
their own fertility, which includes access to abortion (Crane and Smith 2006). In short,
women’s ability to gain more time and traction in the workplace requires their ability to
control their reproductive system, and decide when and when not to have a child
(Pillard 2006). This control allows them to leave the private sphere and enter the public
one because they do not have to stay home and mother young children. Former
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Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out that women having the ability
to decide to have children is the same as giving them equal citizenship (Ginsburg 1984).
This control has allowed them to change their role in society from wife and mother to
virtually anything they choose. It gives them more control over their political, economic,
and social life while allowing them to establish themselves in the public sphere (Siegel
2013).
Arguments against abortion oftentimes take on a paternalistic air, meaning that
they articulate that abortion harms women, and it is unjustifiable (Mayans and Vaca
2017). It assumes that women need protection, even from their own right to
reproductive control. This aligns with religion, because the argument that they are
submissive and childlike creatures that require protection, is also one that religious
groups promote in terms of women’s role in society and marriage. When religion itself is
promoted and orthodoxically followed, as does women’s infantilization and
participation in primarily the private sphere. This anti-abortion sentiment, and women
in subordinate positions outside of the home, come from the same paternalistic
argument.
This research seeks to see the relationship between religion and other
identification factors on gender roles, and women in leadership positions in the church.
Socialization is the combination of values, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and actions that
become fundamental parts of our everyday lives (Anderson and Zyhowski 2017).
Research has shown that when children come from homes where their mother is a single
parent, or they have a mother who works, they are more likely to have more liberal ideas
of gender and leftist policy views (Bertrand 2019). If the home has strong, and orthodox
religious values, it could suggest a less positive view of gender equality and women in
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positions of power. The sphere itself promotes conservative values that promote the idea
of women as frail, submissive, creatures, and describes their rightful place as one in the
home or private sphere (Bendroth 2001; Chaves 1997). Women are essentially trying to
achieve equality in a sphere that, at times, promotes ideas that keep them out of the
workplace in general.
This work hypothesizes that a majority of the population is supportive of women
holding positions of power and control in the church, but as the level of power increases,
the level of support will as well. In addition, this work hypothesizes that like other social
issues, higher levels of education, and income will create higher levels of support for
women holding positions of power in the church setting. The above research asserts that
religion has an effect on its members, creating more conservative opinions both
politically and in regarding to gender. This sphere has remained one that women have
been unable to infiltrate and achieve equality. In a culture that, at times, promotes the
subordination of women, this research seeks to find, what is keeping women from
breaking that stained-glass ceiling?

Data and Methods
The data for this research was collected in a survey format from March 23-27,
2020. The total sample size for this survey was 3,100. It was collected through Qualtrics
Panels. Qualtrics Panels recruits from a variety of panel maintainers and uses a nonprobability quota system set by Census Bureau distributions on age, race, region, and
gender (Boas et al. 2020). The survey included questions about the respondent’s views
on politics, the role of women in the church, and general questions regarding their
gender, location, income, and other identifying questions.
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In order to see how respondents varied on the role of women in the church, the
survey asked them four questions. The questions ranged from little to complete control
over the congregation. The first was whether or not the respondent felt that women
should be able to teach Sunday School or religious education classes, the second was
whether or not the respondent felt that women should be able to lead congregational
singing, the third was whether they felt that women should be able to preach at women’s
conferences or retreats, and the fourth was whether or not they felt that women should
be able to preach from behind the pulpit on Sundays. This was supposed to confirm the
hypothesis of this paper, that as the amount of power being held went up, the levels of
support would decrease. If this paper’s hypothesis is correct, the data would indicate a
decline in the amount of support along with that range. In addition, looking at the basic
identifying factors along with political party preference, gender, education, marital
status, income, biblical interpretation, church attendance, age, region in which they live,
and their opinion on the nation becoming too feminized and weak.
Findings
Identification Factors and Support
The first set of analyses examined how various identification factors affected the
levels of support for women in the positions of power in the church. This was done to
see what characteristics lead to less support for women in power. Figure one examines
the effect of gender. The trend amongst the graphs shows that women are consistently
more supportive than men. Men support women teaching Sunday School at
approximately 80.9%, leading congregational singing at 76.7%, preach during women’s
conferences or retreats at 76.9%, and allowing them to preach from the pulpit at about
72%. Women support other women teaching Sunday school at 85.2%, leading
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congregational singing at about 83.8%, preaching during women’s conferences or
retreats at 81.8%, and preaching from the pulpit at 77.9%.
Figure two shows the effect of marital status on levels of support. In general,
married and widowed people showed the highest levels of support. Married people
supported the Sunday school variable at 88%, the congregational singing variable at
85.1%, the women’s retreat variable at 84.5%, and the pulpit variable at 78.3%. The
single people supported the Sunday school variable at 78.6%, the congregational singing
variable at 76%, the women’s retreat variable at 73.8%, and the pulpit variable at 72.3%.
Divorced respondents supported the Sunday school variable at 88%, the congregational
singing variable at 86.2%, the women’s retreat variable at 85.5%, and the pulpit variable
at 79.4%. The widowed people supported the Sunday school variable at 92.4%, the
congregational singing variable at about 93.3%, the women’s retreat variable at 91.6%,
and the pulpit variable at 89.1%. This divide between the marital statuses is notable and
provides a topic for discussion later in the paper.
Figure three examines the effect of race on variable support. In general, the white
portion of the sample showed the greatest level of support across each of the four
leadership scenarios, followed by the other three groups. The white part of the sample
supported the Sunday school question at about 87.4%, the congregational singing
variable at about 85.3%, the women’s retreat variable at 84.5%, and the pulpit variable
at 79.1%. The black portion of the sample supported the Sunday school variable at
74.9%, the congregational singing variable at 70.8%, the women’s retreat variable at
67%, and the pulpit variable at 67.8%. The Hispanic part of the sample supported the
Sunday school variable at 82.1%, the congregational singing variable at 75.5%, the
women’s retreat variable at 78.8%, and the pulpit variable at 72.2%. The Asian part of
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the sample showed support for the Sunday school variable at about 83%, the
congregational singing variable at 81%, the women’s retreat variable at about 76%, and
the pulpit variable at 77%.
The fourth figure looked at the varying levels of support for the different religious
identities. This analysis is important because it seeks to see if the followers of these
religions are generally supportive of women in positions of church power. It suggests
potential further change. The Protestant group had an average support level of 87.6%,
the Catholic group had an average support level of 80.4%, the Mormon group had an
average support level of 81.6%, the Orthodox sample had an average support level of
64.7%, the other Christian group had an average support level of 77.2%, the Jewish
sample had an average support level of 87.7 %, the Muslim sample had an average
support level of 72.4%, the Buddhist sample had an average support level of 78.5%, the
Hindu sample had an average support level of 67.2%, the Sikh sample had an average
support level of 46.9%, the Atheist had an average support level of 74.2%, the Agnostic
sample had an average support level of 88.9%, the nothing in particular sample had an
average support level of 73.5%, and the all others sample had an average support level of
72.1%. This analysis showed that the support was from lowest to highest, Sikh,
Orthodox, Hindu, All Others, Muslim, Nothing in Particular, Atheist, Other Christian,
Buddhist, Catholic, Mormon, Protestant, Jewish, and Agnostic.
The next analysis, figure five, looked at the education level. It showed that as the
respondent’s education level increased, as did their support for women in positions of
church power. The less than high school sample had an average support level of 72.2%,
the high school education or GED sample had an average support of 76.7%, some college
or trade school sample had an average support of 81.8%, the four-year college degree
17

sample had an average support of 84.2%, and the graduate education sample had an
average support of 85.5%. This analysis confirms the hypothesis of this thesis, which
states that as the respondent’s education level increases, as does their support for
gender equality in religious institutions.
Figure six looks at the effect of church attendance. This showed that respondents
who reported attending church more than once a week had an average support level of
79.5%, respondents who reported attending once a week were at 80.5%, respondents
who reported attending a few times a month were at 75.8%, respondents who reported
attending a few times a year were at 83.4%, people who reported seldomly attending
were at 78.9%, and respondents who reported never attending were at 78.9%. The
analysis showed that there is not a consistent trend amongst attendance. People who
reported attending a few times a month were less supportive than people who reported
attending once a week, or a few times a week. There was little correlation between more
attendance and less support for traditional gender roles.
Figure seven examined the effect of attention to politics on levels of support. It
showed that people who pay more attention to politics, also are more supportive of
women in those positions of authority. People who pay a great deal of attention to
politics had an average support level of 89.5%, and people who pay no attention to
politics were only at 57.8%. This provides an interesting topic for discussion, as well.
Because religious institutions and religious leaders occasionally serve as political
influencers, it is interesting that the people who pay more attention and are perhaps
more involved by proxy show more liberal ideas of gender.
Figure eight shows the breakdown of support amongst the four regions of the
United States. These show that there are virtually little to no differences amongst the
18

Northwest, South, and Midwest, but slightly increased levels of support in the West.
This is interesting and provides a further topic of discussion. The natural inclination
would be to assume a difference between the South, and Northwest parts of the United
States because of the increased conservatism in the South, and increased religiosity.
However, this is not the case. There are little to no differences across the regions and
church power variables when taking into account the confidence variables.

Figure 1
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Figure 2

Figure 3
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Figure 4

Figure 5
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Figure 6

Figure 7
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Figure 8

Regression: Education
The next set of analyses examines the relationship between education and
support for women teaching Sunday school. The regression shows that for women with a
high school diploma or less, the likelihood of support was approximately 85%, while
women with some college or higher are even more likely at about 89%. The difference
for men was even more apparent. Men with a high school diploma or less had a
likelihood of support at about 79%, while men with some college or more had about
87%. For women, it was a 4% difference, while for men it was 8%. The next analysis
looked at the effect of education on the congregational singing variable. This showed
that men with a high school education or less were at about 77%, while men with a
college education or higher were at about 82%. Women with a high school education or
lower were at about 84%, while women who had some college education or higher were
at 89%. This was a 5% difference for men and a 5% difference for women. The next
analysis looked at the effect of education on the women’s retreat variable. It showed that
23

men with a high school education or less were at about 74% and men with some college
or higher 83%. Women with a high school education or less were at about 81%, and
women with some college or more were at about 87%. That is a 9% difference for men
and a 6% difference for women. The last analysis for the education regression looked at
the pulpit variable. This showed that men with a high school education or less had a
likelihood of support at about 71%, and men with some college or more were at about
77%. Women with a high school education or less were at about 78%, while women with
some college or higher were at about 84%. That is a 6% difference for men and 6% for
women. That is an average difference of 7% for men, and 5.25% difference for women.
Overall, these analyses show that as education increases, as does support for women in
positions of church power. In addition, it shows that this effect is stronger on men than
women.

Figure 9
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Figure 10

Figure 11
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Figure 12

Regression: Bible Interpretation
The next analyses looked at how the respondents felt about women in positions of
church power, and how they felt about biblical interpretation. The survey asked them
whether they thought that the bible should be interpreted literally, as in word for word,
or in a more theoretical sense. The first analysis, figure 13, shows that men from the
sample who believed in a literal interpretation believed that women should be allowed
to teach Sunday school at a likelihood of around 86%, while ones who believed in a
different interpretation were at about 78%. For women, this ranged from 87% to 84%.
This was the opposite effect expected from this study. However, for the other analyses,
the women in the sample showed more likelihood of support for the varying power
positions if they also believed in a theoretical interpretation. The male portion of the
sample continued the trend from the first analysis across the rest. They had higher levels
of support if they believed in literal interpretation than if they believed in a theoretical
one.
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Figure 13

Figure 14
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Figure 15

Figure 16

Regression: Too Feminized and Weak
The next set of analyses looked at how the respondents felt about the nation’s
current persona. The survey asked the respondents if they felt that the nation was
becoming too feminized and weak. This question aimed at asking respondents if they
held any sexist values. The Sunday school analysis showed little difference between the
groups across both genders. Women showed slightly more likelihood of support if they
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agreed that the nation was becoming too feminized and weak. That trend held in the
congregational singing analysis, the women’s retreat analysis, and the pulpit analysis.
For men, there was very little difference between the agree and disagree group until the
pulpit analysis. In the pulpit analysis, men who agreed that the nation was becoming too
feminized and weak were more likely to agree that women should be able to preach from
behind the pulpit on Sundays. Overall, the group that showed the least amount of
support across the four analyses was the sample that neither agreed nor disagreed with
the nation becoming too feminized and weak.
Figure 17
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Figure 18

Figure 19
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Figure 20

Regression: Age
The next set of analyses examined the effect of age on the four categories of
church power. The Sunday school analysis showed an increased likelihood of support as
the respondent’s age increases. However, the female part of the sample outpaces the
male part of the sample at about 28. The congregational singing analysis shows a similar
trend where the likelihood of support increases as the respondent’s age increases. The
women’s retreat analysis shows a similar tread where the female sample outpaces the
male sample at about 30. In addition, the relationship is not as positive or distinct in
this analysis and starts to level off. The last analysis has the same trend as the first three
for the female sample but has little to no effect on the male sample. This is an
interesting finding and suggests that the effect levels off for men as the amount of power
increases.
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Figure 21

Figure 22
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Figure 23

Figure 24

Regression: Income
The next set of analyses looks at the effect of income on the likelihood of support
for women in positions of church power. All four analyses show a consistent trend. They
indicate that as the respondent’s income level rises, as does the support. For women,
this effect is slightly stronger, as is indicated by the consistent slope and positive
relationship. For men, the relationship is less strong. In the congregational singing
33

analysis particularly, the line levels off. Women also have a consistently higher
beginning and ending levels of support, consistent with the previous analyses of gender.
Figure 25

Figure 26
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Figure 27

Figure 28

Regression: Church Attendance
The next set of analyses examined race and church attendance. Across all of the
analyses, the white part of the sample has a higher likelihood of support across all four
power analyses. The black part of the sample and the remaining racial groups have
lower likelihoods of support. In addition, there is not a consistent trend amongst the
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different church attendance levels. This indicates that there is little correlation between
support for women in positions of authority and church attendance. This lack of
correlation is interesting and provides an opportunity for further analysis as does the
racial divide in support.
Figure 29

Figure 30
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Figure 31

Figure 32
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Regression: Party Identification
The last set of analyses look at the effect of party identification. Because the
church, at times, serves as a political arena, this provided an interesting view on this
effect. In the first analysis, the Sunday school analysis, the Democrat and Republican
sample see a decline in support as the attendance variable increases. The congregational
singing and women’s retreat analysis shows that for the Republican sample, support
goes down as attendance goes up. But for the Democrat and Independent sample, the
level of support increases as attendance increases. For the last analysis, all three groups
see an increase in support as attendance goes up. This indicates that for the pulpit
analysis, all three groups see an increase of support as their attendance increases. This
indicates that their amount of support does change as attendance changes, and that
varies amongst parties. In addition, the Independent portion of the sample has less
support across the analyses and seems to be less affected by attendance level, except in
the pulpit analysis.
Figure 33
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Figure 34

Figure 35
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Figure 36

Discussion
Four main points of the findings of this paper emerge for further analysis. The
first is the religious breakdown and the causes, the second is the racial divide, the third
is the marital and single divide, and the fourth is age. These topics deserve more
consideration because they remain an explanation for lack of support, or present an
interesting explanatory factor that could warrant further research.
In the breakdown of support amongst the different religious groups accounted for
in this study, some were generally more supportive than others. The backgrounds of
these religions provide an explanation for the demonstrated support or lack of support.
The Sikh group had an average support level across the measures of 46.9%, orthodox
followers were at 64.7%, Hindus were at 67.2%, all others were at 72.1%, Muslims were
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at 72.4%, people without a religion were at 73.5%, Atheists were at 74.2%, other
Christians were at 77.2%, Buddhists were at 78.5%, Catholics were at 80.4%, Mormons
were at 81.6%, Protestants were at 87.6%, Jewish people were at 87.7%, and Agnostics
were at 88.9%. While the Sikh religion allows and encourages women to take on any
leadership role a man does, the statistics suggest a lack of support for their position of
power (USC 2016). The Sikh religion does not have a true set of clergy, but it seems that
a male preference still exists for leadership. The orthodox church does not ordain or
allow women, which could explain the low support level. However, some of the highest
support levels are churches that do not ordain or allow women to lead, as do most
protestant religions (Masci 2020). The Catholic, Jewish, and Mormon samples had high
support levels across the measures. This indicates a desire for more gender equality in
those spaces where it currently does not exist. However, this also shows that for some
religions, their low support levels can be attributed to the fact that their religion does
not allow women to lead congregations and promotes heteronormative values that
encourage women to remain in the private sphere. However, for some, and some of the
highest groups, it is an indicator of a desire for women in positions of church power as
leaders where there are not any. This research can serve as an indicator of those
religious affiliations that their followers are ready for and support gender equality in
that sphere. While this does not negate the struggle of women to become ordained
religious leaders and the underemployment or unemployment they experience, it does
suggest potential future change driven by followers specifically in the Catholic, Mormon,
and Jewish faiths.
The second finding that deserves more attention is the racial divide in the
analyses. The analyses showed a divide in support amongst the white and black parts of
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the sample. A potential explanation for this is the religious breakdown of these groups,
or the educational or income divide. The regression analysis showed that parts of the
sample that had higher income levels or education levels had higher levels of potential
support for women in leadership positions in churches. Further analysis of the dataset
showed that the religious breakdown of the white part of the sample was 23.4%
Protestant, and 24% Catholic. The breakdown of the black part of the sample 33.3%
identified as other Christian, which in this survey included the Baptist option. The
largest percentage of respondents that chose the other Christian option chose either the
n/a option or the Baptist option. 25.4% of the Baptist option consisted of the black
sample. This work suggests that this could be one of the underlying causes. In addition,
the white part of the sample has a higher income level than the black sample. The
regression analysis showed that as income rises, as does support. This could also be a
possible explanation. Also, they have a slightly higher education level mean. The
education analysis also indicated that there is a relationship between higher education
levels and support. All three of these findings could indicate the divide.
The third point of analysis that needs further discussion is the divide between the
marital and single samples. The analyses of support and marital status showed that
marital people are more supportive across the analyses than single people. This was the
opposite of the effect that was expected. Because the single part of the sample is
typically younger, it was expected that the young people would drive the sample with a
more leftist view of gender. However, previous research suggests that having children
changes how one feels about the world tremendously (Elder and Greene 2008).
Specifically, when one has a child it raises their concern about the world around them,
including health, safety, education, and opportunity. It also creates a unique liberalizing
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effect. Things like the gender gap and social welfare become more apparent. This effect
could be attributed to this phenomenon. It is possible that when the married portion of
the sample, likely with children, saw those questions is a personal light. They want their
children to have every chance possible, and the questions shed light on inequality in the
religious arena. Another explanation could be that they are older, make more money,
and have a higher education level. The survey showed that 80.9% of the married sample
have some college or higher. Only 68.8% of the single sample have some college or
higher. The income data shows a similar trend. 69.9% of the married sample make
$50,000 or more a year, while only 33.2% of the single sample makes that much. This
further confirms the continuing theme that higher levels of income and education lead
to higher levels of support, and that there is a definite child effect on one's political and
world outlook.
The fourth point of further discussion involves age. I originally thought that there
would be a negative relationship between age and support for women in religious
positions of power. However, this turned out to not be the case. Women saw a consistent
increase in support amongst all measures, and men saw them in all but less so in the
pulpit measurement. Previous research suggested that one mellows on social issues as
they age (Burge 2020). This particular research identified the relationship between age
and feelings about abortion. Burge found that as one ages, their support for abortion
seems to trend slightly upward. This could be a result of that same effect. As with their
feelings on abortion, older Americans could be softening on the issue. In addition, there
could be an additional effect of increasing education level and income. The regression
analyses showed that as income and education increased levels of support. These results
could be similar to the divide in the marital and single samples.
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Overall, the surprising findings within this paper can be explained through
further analysis of the data set and consultation of previous research.

Conclusion
In conclusion, this work analyzed the national support levels for women in
positions of church power. It ran analyses to determine what causes higher or lower
levels of support and posed questions for further analysis and future research. The
regression analyses showed that as education level and income level rise, as does the
respondent’s likelihood of support for women in positions of church power or authority.
In addition, there are distinct racial and marital status divides amongst levels of
support. The religious levels of support suggest a potential change for women in access
to positions of authority and confirm existing struggles within specific religions.
Additionally, the work showed that the more the respondent paid attention to politics,
the more accepting they were of the four women in positions of power analyses. The
biblical literalism analysis showed that for women, they had a higher likelihood of
support if they believed in a theoretical interpretation, while men showed a higher
likelihood of support if they believed in a literal interpretation. The analysis which
incorporated the survey question asking respondents if the nation was becoming too
feminized and weak showed that for women, they were more likely to support women in
positions of church power if they also agreed with the statement. For men, there was
little difference between the two on the first three analyses, but showed more support on
the pulpit analysis if they also support a literal interpretation. These findings provide a
framework for researching female clergy leaders and understanding the lag in equality
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in religious circles. It also poses a format for surveying people about women clergy and
future research.
This work did have some limitations. In order to better this study, the initial
survey could have had additional questions that targeted hostile and benevolent sexism.
In order to see the root effects of this, it would have been necessary to look more closely
at how the respondents felt about gender norms, and how closely they aligned
themselves with heteronormative values. This would have helped attribute the lag in
equality to specific ideals and types of sexism. In addition, it would have been helpful to
have additional survey questions that asked respondents how they felt about women in
other positions of power in male-dominated workplaces. This could have confirmed
similar trends or indicated that the religious sphere has a unique trend. Further
conclusions could have been reached if the survey had included policy opinion questions
on various topics like abortion, immigration, income equality, and hiring quotas. This
would have allowed us to see if there was a definite party effect and if being more leftist
on certain policies creates higher likelihoods of support for women in positions of
power.
Future research could look at the racial divide in support, and examine the
potential causes of that and the effect of various religious affiliations. In addition, it
could assess the effect of benevolent and hostile sexism. Previous research has pointed
out the effect of those types of sexism on the 2016 election and political participation,
but it could also be a potential underlying effect for the stained-glass ceiling
phenomena. Additionally, it would be interesting to see if this same effect applied to
other fields. Using the same model of increasing levels of power and support survey
questions would be ideal. Male-dominated fields like medicine, STEM, and law would be
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starting points. It could indicate levels of sexism that still exist in American society. It
would also be interesting to examine the effect between different policies and support
for women in positions of power. This could indicate a larger effect between the party
and the leftist policy. All of these avenues for further research would continue to
demonstrate the difficulty in achieving gender equality in the United States, and suggest
potential future change or stagnancy.
Overall, this work proposes a method for measuring support for women clergy
and continues the discussion of stained-glass ceiling obstacles. It also demonstrates the
various levels of support for various identity groups and poses explanations for those
support levels. In short, this work found that support levels for women clergy are high,
which opens up the discussion for further work - why exactly is the glass ceiling still
intact?
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